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If curriculum reform be thy plea, consider this-
That in the course of scrutiny, no program, (even the one in
place),
Should see salvation.
Jim Moliterno hosts a forum on teaching legal ethics and then
writes a major piece on why it is best to teach ethics by simula-
tion.' If it seems that Jim's desire to teach ethics came first,
with simulation the chosen vehicle-don't believe it.
Langdell didn't wake with the sudden flash: "I want to teach
law scientifically. How can I?" He didn't jump up, run to his
desk, pick up his quill, and list possible teaching methods. No,
from the very start, Langdell wanted to use the case method.
Who knows why? Perhaps he liked being in the front of the
room, prancing around, firing questions.
Only later did he come up with that nonsense about libraries
as labs.'
In one split-brain research experiment, the guy wearing the
white coat told the subject's nonverbal right-brain "Get up and
walk across the room." The verbal left-brain did not hear the
instructions-split-brain research works this way. The subject
got up and began walking.
"What are you doing?" asked the guy in the white coat.
* The Editorial Board of the William & Mary Law Review wishes Professor
Hegland much continued success a~id happiness.
1. James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional
Responsibility, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 71 (1996).
2. For a general discussion of Langdell's teaching methods, see Robert Stevens,
LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850'S (1983); see also Ar-
thur D. Austin, Is the Casebook Method Obsolete?, 6 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 161-
65 (1965).
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"Going to get a drink of water," replied the left-side, not miss-
ing a beat.
"Yo, Christopher, how come we're reading cases?"
Excitement precedes analysis; choice precedes justification.
I would love to teach with Jim. He is enthusiastic and has
carloads of great ideas. I would love to be involved in the pro-
gram he proposes. What I like about Jim's proposal, however,
has little to do with teaching professional responsibility. What
I like is its boldness and, for lack of a more ponderous word, its
fun. Learning by simulation is not about students staying at
home, highlighting passages with yellow markers; it's students
out there struggling with problems, arguing and planning, and
laughing with their colleagues.
Jim doesn't light candles; he lights sparklers!
Our students don't envision a future of fun. They're in it for
the money, for the justice, or, for their parents. Someone, I be-
lieve Orwell, wrote of professional masks: over the years, faces
grow to fit them. The lawyer's mask (and law professors') is
something of a downer-successful, yes, but a tad staid and
stodgy, seldom spontaneous or super. Let's teach our students
that they can create their own professional selves--they need
not be created by them. Let's eat peaches and teach most that if
you don't like things, you can always call a forum.
We work in splendid isolation. Jim calls for collaboration.
While I love it when it's just me and WordPerfect, struggling to
get through the next sentence, I miss the salad days of Legal
Services-the days when the five lawyers in our office would get
together and talk cases, everyone on the same side, everyone
contributing to the work of others. If there was more of this type
of collaboration in law teaching, we would be happier and better.
As things are now, as some have said, "going into someone else's
class is viewed as an assault."
I would love to go to Jim's class and, as long as he gave me
plenty of notice, I would welcome him in mine. (Definitely if I
got to choose the day).
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The thrust of Jim's proposal is teaching issues of professional
responsibility through simulations rather than through a sepa-
rate ethics course.3 Oh, hum. But don't let him fool you. Jim's
proposal goes far beyond teaching ethics; it goes to the heart and
soul of legal education.
Students will take, under his proposal, twenty-five percent of
their units in non-Socratic/lecture contexts focusing on daily
lawyering concerns.4
A blast of fresh air. The current tide runs against the practi-
cal concerns of lawyering. Indeed, it even runs against
Langdell's "legal science." "Legal doctrine" is fast becoming an
academic embarrassment, as was "apprenticeship" to Langdell.5
Interdisciplinary analysis rules the day and black-letter is going
the way of the square dance.
Consider the impact of Jim's proposal on law school hiring.
Today's "hot prospects" boast Fulbrights and PhDs. On the cut-
ting edge of theory, they leap deep disciplines in a single bound.
They know their Public Choice Theory, their Chaos Theory, and
their Obscure French philosophers. Don't get me wrong: They do
bring important insights. But when it comes to the problems of
Smith & Jones, P.C., they have neither the background nor the
interest. Jim could force law schools to hire folks who have prac-
ticed law and who enjoy lawyering. Service in the trenches
would no longer be viewed as an embarrassing interlude be-
tween Graduate School and Publication.
Jim's proposal would also force us, for the educational good of
our students, to give up some of our vanity. Simulations are very
effective; unfortunately, they are also very labor-intensive. Once
one has taught a Socratic course a couple of times, preparation
time falls to a few hours a day, leaving one with a lot of time to
spare for writing. Simulations, by way of contrast, are taught
one-on-one, in realtime. Teaching a simulation-based class
leaves one with less time to engage in legal scholarship and,
3. See Moliterno, supra note 1, at 104.
4. Eg., id. at 112.
5. See STEVENS, supra note 2.
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probably, less interest in doing so. Law professors write in their
areas of substantive expertise. Simulations focus on the teaching
and learning processes. Professors teaching simulations, there-
fore, likely will write about teaching or, still worse, practical
stuff.
Neither gets the top spot in the Harvard Law Review.
Like other forms of great teaching, simulations are silent. In
Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, Sir Thomas More
discusses career choices with the ambitious Richard Rich.
[More:I Why not be a teacher? You'd be a fine teacher. Per-
haps even a great one.
[Rich:I And if I was, who would know it?
[More:] You, your pupils, your friends, God. Not a bad public
that.
6
Of course, this was before U.S. News & World Report.
Essentially, Jim proposes that students be required to take
the basic William and Mary legal skills and ethics sequence.'
This sequence would consist of six units in the first year, and
ten units in the second year, including four of externship' The
sequence would cover legal research and writing, appellate advo-
cacy, trial practice, and, presumably, a healthy dose of ethics.'
Jim also proposes that one of the four units allocated to a list of
eleven second- and third-year courses should be devoted to pro-
fessional responsibility simulations." Assuming that students
will take six of these upper division courses, they will graduate
having spent twenty-five percent of their work in simulated
courses.11
6. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 8-9 (Vintage Books 1990) (1960).
7. See Moliterno, supra note 1, at 106.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 112.
10. Id. at 106.
11. Id. at 112.
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Again, I love Jim's boldness and his willingness to stir the
pot. Disagreement is in the details.
Based on my understanding of what the skills and ethics
sequence encompasses, I would vote for it in a second, particu-
larly with its added externships. Jim's intrusion into the second
and third years is what gives me pause. First, I'm not sure we
need that many simulations. Second, I'm not sure that we
should devote so much time to professional responsibility. Final-
ly, though I am uncomfortable with forcing others to be free, if
we are to invade the second and third years, I would allow flexi-
bility; although the commandeered unit might be spent on simu-
lations, it could as well be spent on "other stuff."
I. How MANY SIMULATIONS Do WE NEED?
If one begins with Jim's "teaching hospital" analogy, we need
to employ a great deal of hands-on practical training in law
school. 2 Because I find the medical analogy faulty, I doubt that
we need so much practical training. The substance of medicine is
doing medicine-better still-there is no "treatment of flu"
standing apart from the treatment of flu. By way of contrast, in
law, substance exists independent of application: one can know a
great deal about contracts without negotiating one, litigating
one, or even drafting one. A teaching hospital does not exist to
teach "bedside manners" or how to get along with other health
care workers.3 A teaching hospital exists to teach how to treat
the flu. To learn how to do medicine, doctors cannot take one or
two hands-on courses, say one in treating flu and the other in
treating heart disease, and then learn the rest by reading medi-
cal books.
Law is different. Simulated law courses focus on the processes
of law-interviewing, negotiation, drafting-rather than the
substance of law. These processes of law are transferable. In-
volving students in two or three simulated experiences should,
therefore, do the trick.
12. For a more detailed discussion of the teaching hospital analogy, see id. at 84-90.
13. Ironically, medical schools found that interns and residents didn't learn good
bedside manner in clinical settings; they now have courses on patient relationships.
NATALIE ROBINS, THE GIRL WHo DIED TwicE (1995).
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II. WHAT Is THERE To TEACH ABOUT PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY?
Before law schools shift a large portion of their curricular
effort to enhancing the teaching of professional responsibility,
the need for such a change must be clearly established. Are the
ethics of lawyers that bad?
My wife does criminal defense and I keep up with the gossip.
Unprofessional conduct does not seem rampant in Tucson and,
when lawyers do act unethically, it's not because they don't
know better.
Recently a few lawyers have been disbarred for stealing cli-
ent money and one has gone to jail for getting a tad too close to
the illegal drug trade. Some lawyers have reputations for de-
manding a large retainer and then doing next to nothing on
behalf of their clients. These lawyers stumble, however, not
because of deficiencies in their legal education; they err because
they are alcoholics, compulsive gamblers, high rollers, or simply
sociopaths.
We can warn law students of the ethical pitfalls lurking in
legal practice. We cannot reshape students' personalities to en-
able them to avoid all dangers. But even if law professors could,
only bushels of bad apples would justify a major curriculum
reform.
I have noticed a disturbing trend. Lawyers have become in-
creasingly cavalier in their treatment of case law. Frequently
lawyers cite decisions for propositions for which they do not
stand. Some lawyers, it seems, stop reading cases upon gradua-
tion; that's what clerks are for. As for the clerks, they don't read
the cases much either; that's what headnotes are for. The de-
mise of case reading is a very sad development, one that is par-
ticularly offensivce to those of us who dwell in "appellate decision
monasteries." It does add, however, an interesting twist to the
deconstructionism debate. Cases do not control future decisions,
not because teenagers can become President, but because cases
aren't read. But I digress.
Not citing cases properly, however, is not an ethical dilemma of
Sartrean proportions. The problem would improve ifjudges would
yell more and if opposing lawyers would rat more. A lot of unpro-
fessional behavior would probably benefit from similar action.
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III. WHAT SHOULD WE TEACH ABOUT LEGAL ETHICS?
I think, for the lack of better terms, that two kinds of con-
cerns exist: "Cathedral Ethics" and "Trench Ethics." Cathedral
Ethics include such topics as: advertising; statements to the
media; conflicts; partnerships with nonlawyers and whether the
adversary system is such a hot idea.
A traditional legal ethics class does a good job of alerting the
students to possible problems embodied in these topics. If stu-
dents approach such concerns in practice, they can look up the
rules. I don't think that simulations in these areas would greatly
further students' understanding of these issues. In fact, tradi-
tional course will probably cover Cathedral Ethics problems
better than simulation-based courses. How is one to ensure that
one covers (once) the "Chinese Wall?"
Trench Ethics are of the "thousand natural shocks that flesh
is heir to" variety. They include those countless daily dilemmas
that lawyers face on little matters, such as: not whether to put a
perjurer on the stand, but the degree to which one can avert
one's eyes; not whether to lie to an adversary, but how evasive
one's answers might be; not whether to represent with "warm
zeal," but when it's OK to go home.
Students must face such quandaries where they arise, in the
trenches. These problems aren't abstract and "Big Principles"
can't solve them. The dilemmas of Trench Ethics are fact-specific
and, in simulations or clinical courses, they are urgent: the wit-
ness is about to go on the stand.
IV. WHAT SHOULD WE TEACH CONCERNING TRENCH ETHICS?
First, we should teach students and lawyers to look at their
own conduct and to not assume that what comes naturally is
necessarily right. Second, we should teach that there are ways of
thinking about ethical problems other than '"hat will help me
win?"
That's it. I'm a minimalist. I write Nutshells.
We cannot possibly teach proper behavior in every situation.
Jim gives a wonderful example of a possible simulation in a
19961
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criminal procedure course. 4 It involves representing a snitch,
who, it develops, is lying and who, it develops, flees from both
the police and the mob. 5 Jim poses a series of difficult choices
that the students must make. 6 I .can see a great deal of ani-
mated discussion as to those choices and I can see that I might
change my mind about what I would do based on those discus-
sions. I do not believe, however, that these dilemmas have "cor-
rect" answers and I'm sure Jim doesn't think so either. The
question about what we can teach is answered: Be sensitive to
the ethical implications of what you do, and think long and hard
before you do it.
Students assume, as Monroe Freedman and William
Simon"8 pointed out long ago, that their job is to advance the
short-term economic interests of their clients. Questions of ethics
tend to collapse into questions of strategy. Students know that
they can't "lie," but they assume, as adversaries, that they must
bend the truth (but only if it works). Students know that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's Rule 11 requires "good faith,"
but they assume, as adversaries, that everything that is not
clearly "bad faith" must be "good faith" (but only if it works).
During simulations these assumptions take wing. Simulated
situations are absolutely the best place to talk about them.
Consider this teacher/student exchange after a simulation:
"Whoa, your client has gotten a lot better since the accident.
He's out playing tennis."
"I didn't say he wasn't playing tennis. All I said was that he
was still badly disabled."
The teacher of Trench Ethics is a bird of prey, slowly circling,
ready to swoop down on the first glimmer of unethical behavior.
Although we all build ethical problems into simulations, I prefer
the ones that the students fall into. In Socratic courses, students
14. Moliterno, supra note 1, at 115.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHIcS 51 n.32 (Mat-
thew Bender 1990).
18. See generally, William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29 (discussing popular legal conceptions
of the goals of client representation).
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analyze the ethical lapses of others; in simulated and clinical
courses, they analyze their own.
What can we teach about solving Trench Ethics problems?
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility is seldom helpful.
Trench Ethics questions aren't about making choices to test the
outer limits of what is acceptable behavior. Rather, Trench Eth-
ics problems involve making decisions about the kind of person
you want to become. The hardest part is recognizing and then
factoring out self-interest: '"hatever is best for my client (or
me) is ethical." Kant urged the universalization of decisions.
That works well with legal ethics: "If you were on an Ethics
Committee of the Bar and you had to draft a rule addressing
that dilemma, what would that rule be?" Thomas Shaffer advis-
es that you think of a wise person you know and then do as
they would do. (If I were to follow his advice, I would follow his
advice.)
My quarrel with Jim only involves how much time we must
devote to issues of professional responsibility. I absolutely agree
with him that simulations are a great way to teach ethics. I also
agree that they offer one thing that a traditional ethics course
never can: In simulated or clinical courses students have to live
with their ethical decisions. Play is continuous.
V. A MANDATORY UNIT OF "OTHER STUFF"
Implicit in Jim's proposal is the notion that the second and
third year curricula "suck." Although I would never use that
word, I agree that we spend far too much time teaching legal
doctrine and that legal education would be far more exciting if
professors were required to spend part of their classroom time
teaching other things. Jim would invade the upper division cur-
riculum and require that many courses devote one unit of in-
struction to teaching professional responsibility simulations.
Although I am a tad uncomfortable with unit allocation re-
quirements, if we are going to go down that road, my rule would
be: In all second and third year courses, the professor shall de-
vote one unit of instruction to "other stuff." Although not a
bright-line rule, it would point the way. Flexibility is the key.
I teach legal writing as part of my small-section contracts
course. Administrators and disgruntled students always push for
1996]
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uniformity. Students say, "my friend is in another section and he
didn't have to write two briefs! It's not fair!"
Imagine a cartoon of a Curriculum committee meeting on the
issue of uniformity.
The "What they say" balloon:
Everyone has strengths and weaknesses. The real value to
the student comes from diversity, allowing each of us to do
what we do best even if other instructors are doing different
things!
The 'What they're thinking" balloon:
I'm the only one around here who has a clue about teaching
writing. I'd rather quit than follow Bozo.
Returning to Jim's example of the criminal law simulation; it's
exciting stuff. Students would love it and they would learn from
it. Maybe the professor, however, would like to spend his or her
unit on having students do such things as: drafting criminal
statutes; 9 going to jails to teach prisoners how to read by help-
ing them read to their kids; riding with on-duty police officers;
visiting jails, domestic violence shelters, or Victim-Witness As-
sistance Centers; reading crime novels such as Crime and Pun-
ishment or, to plug a current favorite, David Simon's Homicide,
A Year on the Killing Street; or watching relevant movies like
American Me and Dead Man Walking.
I would require professors to use one unit of work to focus on
"other stuff." As noted above, that "other stuff' could be simula-
tions, novels, community service (an AIDS class could produce a
legal booklet on the legal issues facing people with AIDS; a
family law class could produce a video on the legal rights of
battered women), or any other "stuff' the professor deems appro-
priate.
As for the precise pedagogical goals of teaching "other
19. See Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Pedagogy, YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 314-34
(1995) (teaching rape law by legislative role-playing).
[Vol. 38:125
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stuff'--I'm sure we can figure them out if we have to.
"Yo, Prof, how come we're reading Frankensten?"
